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Abstract 
 
The focus of this study is to establish an institutional economics framework of 
interorganizational cooperation specific to supply chain management. In contrast to 
transaction cost economics, an institutional economics approach uses social institutions to 
explain transactions. This theory develops a framework using the causal relationships of 
interorganizational trust, individualism and collectivism, and JIT/TQM on 
interorganizational cooperation. Moreover, JIT/TQM is hypothesized to exert a 
superordinate goal effect over interorganizational trust and individualism and collectivism 
on interorganizational cooperation. This theory poses a new paradigm to explain the 
uneven adoption of interorganizational cooperation practices in the industrialized, newly 
industrialized, and post-communist societies. 
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Introduction 
 
Since their introduction to the European countries and the United States from Japan in the 
1980s, interorganizational cooperation between buyers and suppliers has provided lower 
costs, shorter development and production cycles, higher quality, and other 
interorganizational synergies (e.g., Ansari & Modarress, 1986, Schonberger, 1982). 
Womack, Jones, and Roos (1990) identified the transition from adversarial supplier 
relations to interorganizational cooperation in the industrialized nations as a major 
improvement for organizational competitiveness. The principal purchasing philosophy 
change consisted of more cooperative, interdependent, and long-term relationships.  
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Interorganizational cooperation may also serve as a potential vehicle for economic 
development in post-communist societies in Central and Eastern Europe, such as 
Romania, as well as in less developed countries, such as Mexico and Argentina. 
According to Hirschman (1958), key industries support a nation's or region's economic 
development by forging links between suppliers and buyers. Little is known, however, of 
interorganizational cooperation in nationally owned and managed firms in post communist 
and less developed countries. Interorganizational cooperation may be practiced in these 
countries largely by foreign firms only, and the expected synergies from a multilevel 
supply chain may not exist. 
 
Some of the resistance to introducing interorganizational cooperation in post-communist 
countries may be due to cultural factors. Nishiguchi (1994) contended that Japanese 
culture had a major effect on the formation of interorganizational cooperation in Japan 
during the mid-1960s. Lewis (1995) stated that the evidence of a widespread 
interorganizational cooperation philosophy in Japan, however, might be illusory, because 
interorganizational cooperation may occur exclusively among members of the same 
kereitsu and traditional adversarial relationships practiced with non-kereitsu members. 
Lewis further affirmed that cultural factors in the United States and Western Europe might 
be more conducive to the formation of interorganizational cooperation than in Japan. He 
observed that Western organizations cooperate to a greater degree than do the Japanese. 
 
As organization and development strategists in post-communist and less developed 
countries attempt to gain increased efficiency in their operations and attempt to introduce 
interorganizational cooperation relationships, the question concerning their causal factors 
arises. The probable causal factors consist of interorganizational trust, culture, and the 
need for reliable, high-quality, and efficient suppliers may provide partial answers. 
Research on these causal factors in post-communist and less developed countries, 
however, is limited. The principal question of this research, therefore, is to propose an 
organizational level theory of interorganizational cooperation that links the principal 
causal factors leading to the formation of interorganizational cooperation in post-
communist and less developed countries. 
 
 
The Search for an Organizational Level Theory of Interorganizational 
Cooperation  
 
In the search for an organizational level theory to explain the phenomenon of 
interorganizational cooperation, a major quandary arises in the choice of the underlying 
theoretical framework. A framework that ignores social factors, such as trust and cultural 
norms, provides an inadequate explanation for interorganizational cooperation. A more 
systematic approach should include social forces (Fukuyama, 1995). Economic theory is 
incomplete without a social systems component (Parsons & Shils, 1951), and institutional 
economics provides a more complete view of organizational phenomena (Sjöstrand, 
1993). 
 
 
Transaction Cost Economics Theory 
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Transaction cost economics (TCE) theory (Williamson, 1981), is a common research 
framework used to study the interorganizational cooperation phenomenon. TCE theory 
deals with the relationship between transaction costs, governance structures, and exchange 
factors. Transaction costs refer to the costs assigned to the exchange of a good or a service 
between two parties. Governance structures relate to the principal modes of material 
acquisition, known as hierarchical and market structures. These structures correspond to 
the make and buy decisions, respectively.  
 
Exchange factors relate to the frequency, level of uncertainty, and asset specificity 
inherent in a transaction. Generally, increased frequency of exchange and dedication of 
organizational assets between two parties, coupled with decreased uncertainty, lead to 
more cooperative market exchanges (Williamson, 1981). High-quality materials, for 
example, reduce transaction costs as the buyer’s quality inspection costs decrease. Based 
on these premises, interorganizational cooperation is characterized as a cooperative market 
structure in which frequent exchanges lead to higher asset specificity and subsequently to 
lower transaction costs.  
 
The major theoretical problem with TCE lies in its omission of social factors to explain 
interorganizational cooperation. To partially accommodate social factors, TCE operates 
within a set of boundary assumptions concerning human nature. A major assumption 
underlying the Williamson (1981) thesis portrays all humans as untrustworthy. Under this 
thesis, trust is merely a calculative approach to securing cooepration. TCE ignores the 
altruistic nature of individuals and the shaping role that a society’s environment exerts on 
altruistic trust. Moreover, TCE is also based on other neoclassical economic assumptions 
wherein all economic actors are considered rational and opportunistic.  
 
TCE is criticized for ignoring the governing role of social factors on transactions among 
individuals and organizations observed in the real world (Arrow, 1975; Elster, 1990; 
Mansbridge, 1990; Tversky & Kahneman, 1990). In other words, TCE, as a theory, 
performs an incomplete job of explaining interorganizational cooperation (Ghoshal & 
Moran, 1996).  
 
 
Institutional Economics Theory 
 
In the theoretical foundation of this research, institutional economics theory is proposed as 
a superior explanation of interorganizational cooperation. An analysis of institutions 
approach removes the assumption that individuals are calculative and motivated by a 
constant level of self-interest and opportunism. Institutional economics is based on the 
understanding of human motivation and behavior. According to North (1990), informal 
institutions, consisting of social values and behaviors, influence a society's organizational 
structures and their economic performance. In this section, institutions and institutional 
change are explained followed by an introduction the total costs of production equation. 
 
 
Institutions and Institutional Change 
 
North’s (1990) treatise on institutions and institutional change attempted to explain how 
institutions profoundly influence the structure of organizations. Institutions are analogous 
to the rules of a game. They provide the standards, constraints, and boundaries for human 
11th IPSERA conference 2002, University of Twente 165
interaction (Sjöstrand, 1993). Institutions may be informal or formal. Informal institutions 
consist of the values, beliefs, rituals, customs, and paradigms held by a group of people. 
These informal institutions are not codified but are taught and learned in informal 
situations. They are commonly held conventions, but specific measurements and 
enforcement rules are avoided (North, 1990).  
 
Informal institutions used frequently over time eventually become codified as formal 
institutions. Frequent use by a large segment of a society leads to an awareness of their 
existence, and their subsequent formalization. Formal institutions consist of systematic 
laws and procedures used to facilitate transactions. Formal institutions often deal with 
compliance costs to increase certainty in transaction outcomes. Kiser and Ostrom (1982) 
posited that institutions, formal and informal, are most suited to controlling recurring 
behaviors.  
 
Informal institutions represent social factors that are often unnoticed yet have a pervasive 
influence on exchange between humans. The focus of this thesis deals largely with the 
unwritten but commonly held values and behaviors in a society.  In summary, institutions 
determine the structure and performance of organizations found in a society. It is within 
and among organizations that people conduct transactions. Furthermore, an organizational 
structure developed under one institutional framework or society may not be as efficient in 
the way it conducts transactions when transferred to a dissimilar. 
 
 
Total Costs of Production Equation  
 
North (1990) also provided a simple formula to illustrate the role of institutions on 
transaction efficiency. In this equation, he stated that the total costs of production is equal 
to the sum of transformation costs and transaction costs. In this symbolic representation, 
transformation costs are defined as the cost of processing the physical characteristics of 
inputs, such as labor, materials, capital, and energy and is concerned primarily with 
objective changes in size, shape, color, as well as other tangible aspects. North then 
defines transaction costs as the costs associated with defining, protecting, and enforcing 
property rights. Transaction costs are incurred, for example, when inspecting quality and 
enforcing contracts. North characterized this total costs of production method as the 
University of Washington methodology based on the work of Steven Cheung (1974) and 
others at the aforementioned school.  
 
Transaction costs account for a large portion of the total costs of production. In their 
research of the U.S. economy, Wallis and North (1986) found that transaction costs 
accounted for 45 percent of national income in 1970, growing from a 25 percent share as 
measured in 1870. They defined organizational activities, such as wholesaling, trade, 
banking, and insurance, as well as by measuring individual careers, such as accountants, 
lawyers, and salesmen as measures of transaction costs. Moreover, North (1990) explained 
that a high degree of uncertainty, created by unfavorable institutions, increased the cost of 
transactions.  
 
 
Organizational Level Institutional economics Framework  
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North (1990), however, did not elaborate on any specific institutional constructs in his 
framework. Kiser and Ostrom (1982) criticized institutionalism for failing to be more 
specific about institutions and the particular role an institution exerts on organizational 
structure. Coleman (1990) elaborated that institutionalism’s framework requires a 
microlevel explanation of how institutions actually work.  
 
 
An Institutional Theory of Cooperation 
 
Considering institutionalism’s macro view as one of its principal limitations, this research 
proposes the development of an organizational level institutional economics framework in 
which specific constructs are employed to predict interorganizational cooperation along 
the supply chain. The constructs used in this theoretical framework consist of 
interorganizational trust, individualism and collectivism, and the superordinate goal of 
just-in-time/total quality management (JIT/TQM).   
 
 
Interorganizational Cooperation  
 
Cooperation has been described by a variety of theorists. It represents the union of two or 
more entities, leading to a more complex combination, which has a greater chance of 
surviving environmental forces than as separate entities. Kropotkin (1902) extended 
Darwin’s theory of natural selection to include cooperation among living and social 
systems. Mead (1937), in studies of living primitive societies, found that cooperative 
social organization leads to higher affluence not found in a solely competitive social 
organization. In a political-historical analysis of civilizations, Eisler (1988) found 
variations between the social dominator model, in which societal exchange is carried out 
in hierarchical and competitive relationships, and the social partnership model, in which 
exchanges are made through cooperative relationships. Eisler’s framework is included in 
the biblia of women’s studies and provides an explanation of male-dominated versus 
male-female shared-power societies through history. Proponents of sociobiology, in a 
different approach, view cooperation as a genetic survival trait (Bateson, 1988). In the 
sociobiological paradigm, cooperation is found among relatives because extended family 
groups survived over individuals who did not cooperate with family and tribal members. 
In sociobiology, cooperation is also considered an evolved trait among humans and other 
life forms (Nowak, May, & Sigmund, 1995).  
 
These approaches to cooperation are varied; they place cooperation in historical and 
ahistorical contexts, at macro- and microsocial settings, and as genetic and learned 
behaviors. This research approach specifically relies on what Campbell (1975) termed as a 
sociocultural explanation for cooperation. His framework rests on variation, selection, and 
retention of behaviors over time. In essence, variation provides the mutations or trials of 
behavior that provide for the adaptation of groups to new situations. Selection involves the 
process of evaluating one variation over another and selecting the better version. Retention 
involves the process of accumulating behaviors and values in a social system. Campbell’s 
theory functions at the social system level because individuals eventually die, but 
institutions and conduct are retained within social systems. Campbell further argued that 
urban social complexity has come about through social evolution rather than through 
sociobiological evolution.  
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Interorganizational cooperation, though, is a very specific form of cooperation found 
among organizations, many of which are industrial for-profit entities that transact to 
acquire resources. Interorganizational cooperation has only been scrutinized in the western 
academic literature over the last two decades. Schonberger (1982) first described to an 
English-speaking audience a Japanese cooperative relationship that linked buyers and 
suppliers. This new interorganizational cooperation form was a radical departure from the 
traditional adversarial form of industrial purchasing. The adversarial supplier relations’ 
model is based on the notion that suppliers should be treated as competitors. The change 
to interorganizational cooperation is a fundamental shift and is diametrically opposed to 
the traditional model of purchasing. The introduction of interorganizational cooperation 
into the industrialized countries in the last twenty years indicates transferability across 
borders.  
 
 
Interorganizational Trust 
 
Trust is considered a causal factor for cooperation and exists at a variety of theoretical 
levels (Worchel, 1979). Trust is generally defined as the positive expectation of outcomes 
when people and groups interact with others under conditions of risk (Boon & Holmes, 
1991).  
 
Understanding the influence of trust among organizations requires an understanding of 
social trust. Social trust is considered the accumulation of trust at a macrosocial level 
(Dasgupta, 1988). Social trust has no liquid value, but it permits value-added activities 
(Coleman, 1990) and is recognized throughout history as a major factor of social order 
(Shapin, 1994). Social trust facilitates the realization of objectives that, in its absence, are 
impossible. Social trust is created when human relationships are aligned to expedite 
performance. 
 
Social level trust rests on several elements. These elements are comprised of the level of 
trustworthiness of the social system, the obligations held between individuals and groups 
in that society (Coleman, 1990), and the presence of a densely linked network of 
individuals and organizations (Marsden, 1992). Social level trust serves as a resource to 
arrange transactions in the future that cannot be enforced by law or formal sanctions alone. 
Social level trust is an institution that facilitates economic exchange and runs counter to 
the self-interested, rational, and utility-maximizing assumptions of neoclassical economics 
(Coleman, 1990).  
 
Social level trust can be reduced and even destroyed. Lewis and Weigert (1985) referred 
to the reduction of social trust as regression from social holism to social atomism. In their 
discussion, social holism refers to an active network of individuals, organizations, and in-
groups, whereas social atomism refers to a societal condition in which individuals belong, 
largely, to a few in-groups. Some of the factors that lead to the destruction of social trust 
are social instability, ideologies that exclude other social members, forced dependency of 
social members (Coleman, 1990), and the pervasive and unwarranted distrust of others 
(Barnes, 1981). Historical evidence provides an excellent example to demonstrate that the 
reduction of social trust can be effected on a society and that the ensuing condition can 
last for centuries (Gambetta, 1988). 
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Interorganizational cooperation depends on interorganizational trust (Ansari & Modarress, 
1986; Lewis, 1995; Ring & Van de Ven, 1992; Smeltzer, 1997). As an example, for a 
buyer to engage in a close trade relationship with a supplier requires commitment beyond 
traditional contractual terms. The terms of agreement required in a close relationship 
cannot be listed in their entirety in a contract, and the desired relationship should be based 
on a high level of trustworthiness. According to Cummings and Bromiley (1996), 
interorganizational trust is comprised of the commitment to honor agreements, honesty in 
negotiations, and the abstention from overly opportunistic behaviors.  
 
As part of an organizational level institutional framework, the following question is posed: 
Is interorganizational trust a significant predictor of interorganizational cooperation? 
 
 
Individualism and Collectivism 
 
The seminal work by Hofstede (1980) on various dimensions of culture provided an 
empirical introduction for the individualism and collectivism (indcol) construct. Indcol is 
a social-level construct in which societies are classified according to their relative ratio of 
individualist and collectivist tendencies.  
 
Individualism is based on the notion of personal rights, pursuit of pleasure, and self-
definition. Among individualists, there is less in-group attachment and in-group members 
have less influence in moderating the individual’s behavior, beliefs, and values. 
Individualists observe and expect universalistic rather than particularistic treatment from 
others. Universalism refers to the notion that individuals should be accorded equal 
treatment based on internalized and universally held norms and standards, with no regard 
to the individual’s quality or classification in society (Parson & Shils, 1951). Particularism 
refers to the idea that individuals should be treated differently, based on each individual’s 
quality or classification. Individualists tend to practice universalistic behaviors with both 
in-groups and out-groups. Hence, individualists are more likely to work with people from 
a variety of groups despite the superficial nature of their relationships. Triandis (1991) 
declared, as an example, that the cocktail party is an invention of individualistic societies.  
 
Extending the effect of individualism into organizations provides relationships important 
to this research. The entrepreneurial organization is credited as a central factor in 
capitalistic development. Entrepreneurship is defined here simply as the set of risk-taking 
and cooperative skills required to bring resources together for economic activity. 
Hirschman (1958) recognized the role of entrepreneurial behaviors and the need for 
cooperation to develop backward linkage industries in developing countries. Fukuyama 
(1995) stated that collectivistic societies are unable to develop large, complex, and 
cooperative relationships among organizations. Individualism has been cited as a 
prerequisite for cooperative entrepreneurial activity (Durkheim, 1933; Kerr & Dunlop, 
1964; Schumpeter, 1934). Some authors have suggested that an optimal combination of 
individualism and collectivism is a necessary prerequisite for entrepreneurial activity and 
interorganizational cooperation, more so than at the extremes of individualist or 
collectivist norms (Coleman, 1990; Hirschman, 1971; Moss-Kanter, 1994).  
 
Hirschman (1958) cited various shortcomings of highly collectivist societies in regard to 
economic development. He stated that the lack of interdependence and linkage among 
entrepreneurs and managers is the most typical distinction of collectivist countries. These 
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distinctions are due to several factors: (a) Collectivists often prefer to maintain a static 
family business rather than bring in nonfamily professional managers, (b) organizations 
exhibit centralized decision making, (c) managers provide for little employee 
participation, and (d) few opportunities for initiative exist for subordinates. Thus, 
economic development and individualism are closely related. 
 
In a collectivistic society, individuals tend to cooperate with in-group members and to 
avoid contact and even compete with out-groups. According to Triandis (1994), in-groups 
are defined as “sets of individuals with whom a person feels similar” (p. 43). Turner 
(1982) defined in-groups as two or more individuals who share a common perceived 
social identity. Membership in collectivist in-groups is generally by ascription, such as 
familial, tribal, and racial ties. Individualistic membership is awarded through 
achievement and common values, such as found in professional organizations and 
religious and political groups. Out-groups are sets of individuals to which a person does 
not belong. Further, out-groups may compete for resources or supremacy of ideology with 
an individual’s in-group. 
 
Collectivists tend to sacrifice their own needs and desires if they are not in accordance 
with the needs and desires of the group. (Erez & Earley, 1987; Triandis et al., 1986; 
Wagner & Moch, 1986). Collectivists are more responsive to in-group members than to 
out-group members (Marin & Triandis, 1984). Collectivists stress in-group loyalty and 
cooperation. In a family context, collectivists favor large cohesive familial relations; 
children stay at home until they marry; group members depend on each other; nepotism is 
common in the workplace; and business is conducted with friends and family (Triandis, 
McCusker, & Hui, 1990).  
 
At the organizational level, hierarchy among group members is the norm, and harmony is 
valued over competitiveness. Leaders consider employees from a benevolent and 
paternalistic relationship. The in-group sets normative values for group members. 
Behaviors with out-group members are characterized as competitive and distrustful. Out-
groups are made up of individuals who do not share a common fate with members of an 
in-group (Eisenstadt & Roniger, 1984). 
 
At the social level, Hart (1988) posed three forms of voluntary cooperation as influenced 
by collectivism: (a) kinship, based on extended family; (b) association, established on 
affection and shared experiences among friends; and (c) contract, based on the modern 
state and society. It is the transition from kinship and association to contract cooperation 
that characterizes the shift from collectivist to individualist cultures. 
 
Although the transfer of Japanese manufacturing practices from Japan to the United States 
has been discussed in general cultural terms (1993; Nishiguchi, 1994; Womack et al., 
1990; Young, 1992), few researchers have tested the role of indcol on interorganizational 
cooperation. As part of an interorganizational level institutional framework, the following 
question is posed: Is interorganizational trust a significant predictor of interorganizational 
cooperation? 
 
 
Superordinate Goal of Just-In-Time/Total Quality Management 
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Superordinate goals increase cooperation between groups (Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, 
& Sherif, 1961; Tajfel, 1982). Sherif et al., in a seminal study, reported their findings that 
illustrate the dynamics of cooperation and superordinate goals. In their field experiment, 
they randomly assigned 24 boys about the age of 12 of lower middle-class protestant 
background into two summer-camp groups. These groups carried out similar activities in 
isolation to develop in-group identity, values, and behaviors, as well as leadership and 
penalty systems.  
 
Once in-group identity was established, the experimenters introduced the two groups to 
each other in competitive activities. These activities reinforced in-group solidarity and 
out-group competitiveness. The inter-group activities consisted of competitive play that 
extended into arguing and fighting. To conclude the experiment, the researchers 
introduced a superordinate goal to induce cooperation. Superordinate goals refer to 
objectives requiring cooperative activity such that (a) the combined efforts of the involved 
groups are required to reach the goal and (b) the goal is of such value that group members 
are motivated to reach the goal. The initial attempt to reach the goal in the Sherif et al. 
(1961) experiment was unsuccessful. The researchers subsequently replaced competitive 
leaders with ones who exhibited tendencies that were more cooperative. Thereafter, the 
two groups began to behave cooperatively, reached the superordinate goals, and were 
referred to as a superordinated group.  
 
Superordinate goals also lead to greater communication, which further encourages 
cooperation. Key individuals who communicate between organizations are referred to as 
boundary spanners. The increased presence of boundary spanners in organizations 
increases communication and subsequent cooperation (Friedman & Podolny, 1992). Due 
to its symbolic nature, communication may also be considered as an element of 
cooperation (Sherif et al., 1961). 
 
Contact and communication between organizations in the absence of superordinate goals, 
however, may not be sufficient to achieve cooperation. Factors such as equal status 
encounters among members of different organizations, intimate rather than casual 
exchanges, pleasurable exchange experiences, and interaction according to superordinate 
goals are required for interorganizational cooperation (Amir, 1969). The presence of a 
superordinate goal is necessary to induce cooperation among groups (Dawes & Thaler, 
1988). Feger (1991) qualified the importance of a superordinate goal, which includes 
perceived interdependence, as the most important factor leading to cooperation.  
 
In the context of this theory, JIT/TQM, an institution designed largely to improve quality 
and improve productivity, functions as the superordinating goal to foster 
interorganizational cooperation among buyer and supplier organizations. Smith, Carroll, 
and Ashford (1995), in a special research forum on intra- and interorganizational 
cooperation, stated, “a new market ethos, sometimes oriented toward new total quality 
management (TQM) philosophies, also underscores the need for cooperation throughout 
organizations” (p. 9). Ring and Van de Ven (1992) declared that organizations pursuing a 
group of diverse objectives require cooperation due to the reciprocal dependencies 
involved between firms. Singh (1997) declared that interorganizational cooperation brings 
organizations together to reduce the risk of failure in complex production.  
 
Thus, buyer organizations faced with changing quality, delivery time, and cost 
performance requirements may demand that their suppliers cooperate more closely, such 
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that they become an extension of the buyer’s JIT/TQM capabilities. JIT/TQM refers here 
to a selection of organizational philosophies and practices consisting of just-in-time (JIT), 
total quality management (TQM), and their common infrastructure practices (CIP) for 
JIT/TQM (Flynn, Sakakibara, & Schroeder, 1995). 
 
Just-in-time (JIT) is considered as both a philosophy and set of techniques to improve 
productivity by reducing waste and simplifying a firm’s processes (Goyal & Deshmukh, 
1992). Total quality management (TQM) functions as a philosophy and system of 
practices to improve process and product quality. The common infrastructure practices 
(CIP) are associated with and support JIT and TQM. These practices provide (a) 
information feedback, (b) management support, (c) plant environment and cleanliness, and 
(d) workforce management.  
 
Just-in-time/total quality management (JIT/TQM) has been described in the literature as a 
predictor of interorganizational cooperation and exerts a superordinate goal effect to bring 
the buyer and supplier into closer interorganizational cooperation relations. The use of 
JIT/TQM may also pose a contravening influence over low interorganizational trust or 
individualism/collectivism, if these work against closer interorganizational cooperation 
relations. The following research questions are posed: Is the superordinate goal of 
JIT/TQM, composed of just-in-time, total quality management, and their CIP for 
JIT/TQM, a significant predictor of interorganizational cooperation? Is the superordinate 
goal effect of JIT/TQM greater than the effect of interorganizational trust and indcol on 
the formation of interorganizational cooperation? 
 
This research attempts to provide an organizational level institutional economics 
theoretical framework to explain interorganizational cooperation. The causal influences of 
interorganizational trust, indcol, and superordinate goal of JIT/TQM are hypothesized as 
predictors of interorganizational cooperation. 
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